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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 













POLICE OFFICER LARRY SHIELDS 
 
    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-13-cv-02241) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable David R. Strawbridge* 
    
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on April 17, 2018 
    
 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 31, 2018) 
___________ 
  
O P I N I O N** 
___________ 
                                                 
* Sitting by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court, and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Joshua Taylor challenges the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his motion for a new 
trial in his § 1983 excessive force action against the Defendant, Police Officer Larry 
Shields. Taylor contends that he is entitled to a new trial on three grounds: (1) the 
Magistrate Judge failed to bar the Defendant’s expert from testifying; (2) the Magistrate 
Judge unfairly prevented him from offering certain impeachment evidence against the 
expert; and (3) the Magistrate Judge unfairly precluded him from admitting the 
Philadelphia Police Department’s off-duty policy into evidence. 
Because the Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Taylor a new 
trial on these same grounds, we will affirm. 
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The parties consented to proceed before Magistrate Judge Strawbridge, who had 
jurisdiction over Taylor’s § 1983 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 636(c). We 
have jurisdiction over final orders of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“The decision to grant or deny a new trial is confided almost entirely to the 
discretion” of the trial court. Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 
1992). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. McKenna 
v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009). To the extent the appeal involves a 
review of evidentiary rulings, including the decision to admit or exclude expert 
testimony, we use an abuse of discretion standard. Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 
237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). We also review the trial court’s case management decisions for 
abuse of discretion. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012).  
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II. Facts and Procedural History 
Taylor and Shields recount contradictory versions of the incident in question. Both 
versions of the facts involve a confrontation on April 25, 2011, between Taylor, in and 
around his residence, and Shields, a Philadelphia police officer who was off duty at the 
time.  
1. Taylor’s Version  
Taylor alleges that he purchased a new firearm, lawfully, around April 25, 2011. 
A. 1064–65. At the time, he was living with his family at 4624 Worth Street in 
Philadelphia. He avers that on April 25, he walked next door to the home of his 
neighbors, the Thompsons, to show his new gun to his friend, Sean Thompson. While 
Taylor was on his way, he made eye contact with Shields, who was wearing plain clothes. 
A. 1068–69. Both parties agree that Taylor’s firearm was in plain view on his body. A. 
1072–73, 75. When Taylor reached the Thompsons, he states that he learned Sean was 
not home from Sean’s wife, Mary Thompson. A. 1071–72. Taylor claims that he left the 
Thompsons’ house to walk back to his home about 4 to 5 minutes later, when Shields 
allegedly approached him, did not identify himself as a police officer, drew his firearm, 
and began to chase Taylor. Br. at 4; A. 1078–80. 
Taylor states that he then ran into his home, shut the door, and fell, causing his 
gun to drop and fall three feet from him. A. 1080-87. He claims that he rolled over onto 
his right side when Shields opened the door, shot Taylor in the chest with Taylor’s 
children present, and ran out. Id. Taylor survived.  
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Mary Thompson testified that she observed Shields run into Taylor’s home with a 
gun, so she rushed to Taylor’s house and found him lying on the floor, having been shot, 
attempting to stand up. A. 1737–40. Taylor acknowledged that Shields called 911, but 
claims that the call was made five minutes after he was shot, rather than immediately. 
2. Police Officer Shields’ Version  
Officer Shields was allegedly helping his sister move on April 25, 2011. A. 897-
901. Unfamiliar with the neighborhood, he saw Taylor leave 4624 Worth Street—which 
he did not know was Taylor’s residence—with a handgun in one hand and an ammunition 
magazine in another, walk into the house next door, and leave only a few seconds later, 
holding a loaded gun. A. 953–57.  Shields alleged that he was concerned that Taylor 
posed a threat, A. 955–57, and avers that as a police officer, he was required to 
investigate further. When Taylor emerged from the Thompsons’ house, Shields claims to 
have said, “My man, stop. Police,” without displaying a badge. A. 972–73. But, Shields 
alleges, when Taylor heard Shields say “Police,” he ran into 2624 Worth Street with a 
gun, and Shields followed him. A. 986–87. Shields claims he was concerned that Taylor 
might pose a threat to someone inside the home. A. 1013–14.  When he approached the 
doorway, Shields states, Taylor was pointing a gun at him. A. 958, 964. Shields admits 
that he fired a shot at Taylor, and claims it was in fear for his life. A. 958, 1013. He then 
returned to his sister’s place, where he and his sister both called 911. A. 944. 
III. Procedural History 
Taylor sued Shields under § 1983 for one count of using excessive force. As the 
parties are familiar with the trial timeline, we summarize in brief.  
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Before the deadline for pre-trial motions, Officer Shields identified Dr. Jonathan 
L. Arden, a forensic pathologist, as his defense expert. Shields intended to present Dr. 
Arden to testify on the bullet trajectory from Shields’ firearm into Taylor’s body. He later 
served Dr. Arden’s expert report on Taylor’s counsel. However, Taylor filed a motion in 
limine to exclude Dr. Arden three months after the deadline, without an explanation for 
the delay. He argued that Dr. Arden, a forensic medical examiner, was unqualified to 
opine on ballistics technology. The Magistrate Judge denied the motion and allowed Dr. 
Arden to testify.1 
At trial, Taylor introduced multiple witnesses who testified that the bullet path 
may have been consistent with Taylor’s account of the shooting, or otherwise that the 
evidence did not conclusively demonstrate the bullet path, one way or another. Dr. Arden 
opined that the evidence was consistent with Shields’ version of the events. Taylor also 
sought to impeach Dr. Arden with evidence of his resignation from a prior job, which the 
Magistrate Judge did not allow. 
The jury returned a verdict for Officer Shields, concluding that his use of force 
against Taylor was justified. Taylor timely moved for a new trial, with the same 
arguments as he sets forth in the present appeal: the Magistrate Judge erred in (1) 
allowing Dr. Arden to testify, (2) excluding impeachment evidence against him, and (3) 
barring the admission of the Philadelphia Police Department’s off-duty policy. After 
briefing and argument, the Magistrate Judge denied Taylor’s motion for a new trial. A.5.  
                                                 
1 Taylor filed a Daubert motion disguised as a general motion in limine, but past the pre-




1. Dr. Arden 
Officer Shields introduced Dr. Arden to opine on Taylor’s position when he was 
shot. Given the relative distance between Taylor and Shields, and given the downward 
path of the bullet inside Taylor’s body, Dr. Arden concluded that Taylor would have 
either been standing up or sitting up at a 90 degree angle when Shields shot him. A. 29. 
Taylor makes two objections to Dr. Arden’s expert testimony: (i) he contends that 
the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his untimely Daubert motion because Dr. Arden 
was unqualified under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to testify on ballistics 
and because his opinion was unsound; and (ii) Taylor objects to the Magistrate Judge’s 
ruling that barred him from offering certain impeachment evidence against Dr. Arden. 
We review the Magistrate Judge’s rulings for an abuse of discretion.  
First, the trial court was within its discretion under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure to enforce its scheduling order and therefore deny Taylor’s Daubert 
motion as untimely. Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 484 F.3d 644, 650–51 (3d Cir. 2007) (“This 
Court and others have frequently upheld a trial court’s exercise of discretion to deny a 
party’s motion to add experts or other fact witnesses after the close of discovery or after a 
deadline in a scheduling order.”). Moreover, Taylor offered no explanation for the 
tardiness of his motion by three months.  
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge initially dismissed Taylor’s Daubert motion as 
untimely, but later, in his opinion denying Taylor a new trial, the Magistrate Judge 
explained his decision at length. He acknowledged that in spite of enforcing pre-trial 
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deadlines, he did not neglect his underlying gatekeeper duty, namely, to ensure that Dr. 
Arden’s expert testimony met the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Rule 702 
provides: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:  
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the 
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.  
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702.  
In rejecting Taylor’s objections to Dr. Arden’s credentials, the Magistrate Judge 
appropriately explained that Dr. Arden—a forensic pathologist with decades of 
experience—was eminently qualified to opine on the path between Officer Shields’ bullet 
and Taylor’s body. Dr. Arden, a trained anatomic and forensic pathologist, has testified 
as an expert witness hundreds of times on the very topic of “bullet trajectories within 
bodies, including the assessment of the relative positioning between a gun and the person 
shot by the gun.” A. 23–24 (quoting Arlen Declaration at 6) (emphasis omitted). The 
Magistrate Judge also rejected Taylor’s objections to Dr. Arden’s diagrams that 
demonstrated the path of the gun and depicted why Dr. Arden believed that Shields’ 
version of the events was consistent with the downward path of the bullet in Taylor’s 
body. The Magistrate Judge deemed Dr. Arden’s opinion to be based on facts that were 
testable, scientifically reliable, and formulated with reliable techniques. Upon reviewing 
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Dr. Arden’s credentials, data, and scientific analysis, the Magistrate Judge denied 
Taylor’s objections to Dr. Arden’s expert testimony.  
Although Taylor may have opposed Dr. Arden’s analysis, we agree that Dr. Arden 
met all of the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert to opine on the exact topic in 
question, and thus the Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Dr. 
Arden to testify as an expert. Absent an abuse of discretion, we “will not substitute our 
own judgment for that of the trial court regarding the admission or exclusion of expert 
testimony.” Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 627 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Moreover, the Magistrate Judge determined that any flaws in Dr. Arden’s analysis, 
such as imprecision in his methodology or assessment, could be addressed on cross-
examination and rebutted with other witness testimony. Accordingly, Taylor vigorously 
cross-examined Dr. Arden and offered multiple witnesses to contradict Dr. Arden’s 
testimony: (i) Mr. Kenneth Katsaris, a police practices expert, opined that the bullet in 
question could vary in its path within the human body, suggesting that there was no 
conclusive answer to how Taylor was positioned A. 1487; (ii) Dr. Mohammed Irfan 
Khan, a trauma surgeon who treated Taylor on the day he was shot, opined that the bullet 
took a strange, spiral path in Taylor’s body A.1235; and (iii) Lieutenant Steven Nolan, an 
investigator from the Philadelphia Police Department, testified that because there was no 
exit wound in Taylor’s body and because witnesses gave contradicting accounts of what 
happened, the Lieutenant was unable to conclude with certainty Taylor’s position when 
he was shot. A. 1212–14. 
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Second, the Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion by barring Taylor from 
offering irrelevant impeachment evidence against Dr. Arden. Taylor sought to introduce 
the circumstances of Dr. Arden’s departure from the Washington Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner (WOCME). Dr. Arden was placed on administrative leave following 
serious accusations of mismanagement and harassment, and resigned.2 Although Taylor 
contended that this evidence of workplace safety risk and racial discrimination put Dr. 
Arden’s qualifications and credibility in doubt, the Magistrate Judge disagreed, and also 
found that this evidence neither met the requirement of Rule 608(b) nor passed the 
balancing test of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 Rule 608(b) permits courts 
to allow, on cross-examination, questions about specific instances of a witness’s conduct 
“if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 
608(b) (emphasis added). Even so, the court may exclude evidence otherwise permissible 
under Rule 608(b) if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice 
under Rule 403. 
Here, the Magistrate Judge found that Taylor failed to meet his burden under 
Rules 608(b) and 403. Evidence of Dr. Arden’s departure from WOCME had no bearing 
on his quality for truthfulness: it was relevant not to his qualifications as a forensic 
medical expert, implicating Rule 702, but to his administrative responsibilities, the 
                                                 
2 WOCME allegedly performed autopsies contrary to certain religious objections, 
mishandled the storage of bodies, failed to follow the proper procedures for autopsies, 
and improperly disposed chemicals, among other accusations. In addition, Dr. Arden was 
personally accused of sexual harassment. A. 12–13. 
3 Although the Magistrate Judge noted that Taylor raised this evidence at the eleventh 
hour, he excluded it on evidentiary grounds. A. 14. 
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Magistrate Judge found, which was not relevant to his expertise in this case. Moreover, 
this evidence—far more prejudicial than probative—had a high potential to confuse the 
jury. A. 17. We agree. Taylor has not shown that the Magistrate Judge abused his 
discretion in so ruling, and thus we affirm this evidentiary decision. 
2. Philadelphia Off-Duty Police Policy 
Taylor also sought to introduce the text of Policy 98-1, the Philadelphia Police 
Department policy that concerns the conduct of off-duty officers. Taylor argues that 
Shields violated Policy 98-1 by failing to identify himself clearly as a police officer and 
by delaying calling 911 after he shot Taylor.4 Taylor sought to use Policy 98-1 to show 
that Officer Shields used excessive force. While Taylor had referenced 98-1 throughout 
the trial, the Magistrate Judge later clarified that the policy itself could not be admitted 
into evidence. Taylor argues that this affected his trial strategy and prejudiced him.  
The Magistrate Judge’s evidentiary decision was not an abuse of discretion, and 
Taylor was not prejudiced by this ruling. The Magistrate Judge allowed Taylor to address 
the substance of the policy at length but did not allow the policy itself to be admitted; the 
Magistrate Judge noted a concern that if the jurors had the text of the policy, the trial 
could stray from a question of the use of excessive force to one of violating the off-duty 
policy. We agree that doing so would be to risk “lead[ing] the jury to equate local policy 
violations with constitutional violations.” McKenna, 582 F.3d at 461. Taylor had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Officer Shields at length regarding the off-duty policy and 
                                                 
4 Policy 98-1 directs off-duty officers to avoid getting involved in situations, but if they 
do, to clearly identify themselves as police, immediately call 911, and remain a witness. 
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practices, notably, Shields’ failure to call 911 leading up to the shooting. Taylor also 
presented Dr. Katsaris as a rebuttal witness to testify about best police practices. In sum, 
Taylor was not prejudiced by the ruling barring admission of Policy 98-1 into evidence.  
V. Conclusion 
Taylor has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in its evidentiary 
rulings and in denying Taylor a new trial. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
Magistrate Judge’s denial of a new trial in its entirety. 
